Privacy

What Zuna learns about you.

Very little, by design. Zuna has no central service. Your account and messages live on the server you joined, run by whoever runs it, and encrypted so that they can't read them. The project itself runs two things: this website, and zuna-push, the relay that wakes iPhones and iPads. Neither sees what you write.

Last changed on 13 November 2026.

The apps

The apps for Windows, macOS, Linux, the web, iPhone and iPad send the project nothing: no analytics, no crash reports, and no account with us.

They connect to:

  • The servers you join, and the media server those servers' admins run for voice and calls.
  • On iPhone and iPad, zuna-push and Apple's push service, for notifications.
  • A site you link to, when you send the link, so your device can make its preview. In the web app, the page is fetched by the web app's host, which your server's admins run.
  • GitHub, from the signed Windows app, to check for updates every six hours.
  • GitHub, from the app for Windows, macOS and Linux, for the list of plugins, when you open Browse in Settings, and every six hours once a plugin from it is installed. A device with no plugins never asks. A plugin you install connects to the sites its page names, and nothing else, and only if it asked to.
  • In the web app, on iPhone and iPad, and on a Mac, Windows and Linux, YouTube, when you press Watch on a video your voice channel or call watches together, and asked about the first time. The video plays in YouTube's own player, which sees your IP address, which video and when, under Google's privacy policy. Whoever puts a video on has their device fetch its title and picture, in the web app through its host.
  • Telegram, from the Windows, Linux, macOS, iPhone and iPad apps, only on a device where you link your own Telegram account, which it uses through Telegram's API. Those chats aren't end-to-end encrypted: Telegram keeps them under its privacy policy, and sees your IP address and when you're online. The project's servers and yours never see them. A call you make or take on it goes through Telegram's relays, which see your IP address, or your proxy's, and who called whom and when, as in Telegram's own apps; the other person never sees your address. On an iPhone, Telegram rings one through Apple's push service, encrypted so that Apple can't read who's calling.

The desktop app on a Mac, and the iPhone app, can send all of that through a SOCKS5 proxy you choose, in Settings, Privacy, so that your servers and the sites you link to see the proxy's address instead of yours, and they connect to nothing while the proxy can't be reached. Calls and watching YouTube together go through it too, so the media server and YouTube see its address as well. The proxy sees which servers you reach and when, never what you send. Notifications on an iPhone still come from Apple's push service, which the phone itself holds.

Your server

Each server is run by its admins, not by the project. It stores your account and your messages, encrypted on your device with keys the server never has. It does see some things: your username, who is in each conversation, when a message was sent to which conversation, and roughly how big, your IP address and your online status. It isn't told who sent each message, though a server set on finding out can often tell from addresses and timing. The security model lists exactly what it can and can't see.

You can delete your account on a server in the app's settings, with your password. The server then erases your profile, your keys and what it kept to sign you in, and frees your username. What you sent stays with the people you sent it to, shown as from a deleted account.

If you report someone, the server keeps whom and why for its admins, but not who reported them, and nothing of what was said, which it can't read.

How long a server keeps its logs and backups is up to its admins. For anything about your account, ask them.

zuna-push, the push relay

Apple only accepts pushes from whoever publishes an app, and a self-hosted server can't hold that key. So servers wake phones through zuna-push, which the project's maintainers run at relay.zuna.chat. Its code is in the repository, and how it works is written up in full.

What it receives

  • When your phone signs up for notifications, about once a week, its Apple push token, and where CallKit is allowed a second token for calls. It checks the first with Apple through a silent push with nothing in it, and hands both back sealed with its own key, as a different handle for each of your servers, and keeps no list of them. Servers only ever see the handles, and can't tell that theirs are for the same phone.
  • When a server sends a push, a handle and a payload that the server sealed for your phone, holding nothing but a conversation's and a message's IDs, or, to clear a notification, which conversation was read on another device and when.

What it can tell

Which server addresses send pushes, when, how big the sealed payloads are, which phone each push is for, and whether it's a call. It never learns who wrote what, or anything in a message: your phone fetches the message from your server and decrypts it itself.

What it keeps

On disk, only its own key. Its rate limits, by phone and by the address asking, and for a day the tokens Apple says don't exist, are held in memory and gone when it restarts.

Apple

Apple delivers each push to your phone, under Apple's privacy policy. It sees a sealed payload it can't open.

Not using it

A server's admins can turn pushes off, or send them through a relay of their own. Phones then see new messages when the app opens. The desktop and web apps don't use the relay at all.

This website

zuna.chat is a set of static pages on the maintainers' own server. It sets no cookies, runs no analytics, and makes no requests to other sites: even its fonts come from here. Like most web servers, the one serving it may log visitors' IP addresses. Downloads come from GitHub's releases, under the GitHub privacy statement.

Changes and questions

This page is part of the project's repository, so every change to it is in its history, with a date and a reason. Questions go to the project's issues, and anything about security to the repository's private "Report a vulnerability".